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of a trade mark, impeding economic efficiency rather than
promoting it.
It may be objected that a sacrifice of clarity and precision
takes place when we move from ‘software’ into its various
subdivisions. In other words, the differences between ‘soft-
ware for the provision of medical services’ and ‘computer-
aided design software’, for example, are smaller and harder
to articulate than those between software itself and any-
thing else. This is true, but is the same problem faced when
classifying goods in any other area. The expediency of
quarantining all digital goods and services in their own cat-
egory (as computer software) is not an excuse for doing so
when the cost is the undermining of the trade mark system.
A similar legitimate issue with subdividing ‘software’ is
determining how narrowly each category must be defined.
Is ‘software for provision of medical services’ specific
enough, or would a radiology AI for the detection of can-
cers need its own specific category? Again, this is the same
issue faced in the classification of all other goods and there
is no reason in principle why ‘software’ should be excepted
from it. There is also no reason why the current law on
clarity and precision could not be applied and developed in
this area. The USPTO takes the view that: ‘Generally, an
identification for “computer software” will be acceptable as
long as both the function/purpose and the field of use are set
forth.’ As such, in the medical example above specification
of the function/purpose of the software as cancer diagnosis
would be necessary for it to be sufficiently clear and precise.
The operation of this approach in other jurisdictions, as well
as its consistency with the European law relating to other
categories of goods and services is evidence enough of its
workability and desirability.
In conclusion, as goods and services are increasingly pro-
vided digitally, the error of confusing their form for their
substance in the market will only become more unsustain-
able. VROOM provides one example of its injustice and inef-
ficiency. While procedural limits prevented a different
outcome, in this case, it throws into stark relief the need for
reconsideration of the current European approach to ‘com-
puter software’ as a clear and precise category of goods.
Stefan Martin
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Copyright
n CJEU clarifies that framing infringes
copyright if TPMs are circumvented
Court of Justice of the European Union, VG Bild-Kunst v
Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, C-392/19 EU:C:2021:181,
9 March 2021
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
has ruled that framing thumbnails in circumvention of
effective technological protection measures (TPMs) is an
act communication to the public.
Legal context and facts
The dispute underlying the preliminary reference by the
German Bundesgerichtshof arose between the Stiftung
Preußischer Kulturbesitz (SPK), the operator of the
German Digital Library (DBB) and collecting society VG
Bild-Kunst (VBK). SPK sought to license the use of thumb-
nails as part of its digital offer, which VBK only agreed
to under the condition that SPK implements effective tech-
nological protection measures (TPMs) that would prevent
third parties from framing the thumbnails. SPK considered
this condition to be unreasonable, while collecting
societies, under the applicable German law, are obliged to
grant licences on reasonable terms to any person requesting
a licence in relation to the works administered by a given
collecting society.
SPK sought a declaration of VBK’s obligation to license
the framing of thumbnails also without the requirement
to adopt TPMs. The Regional Court of Berlin dismissed
the claim. On appeal, however, the High Regional Court
of Berlin (KG Berlin) sided with SPK. On the subsequent
appeal, VG Bild-Kunst requested the German Federal
Supreme Court (BGH) to set aside the judgment of the KG
Berlin. The BGH decided to stay the proceedings and
requested a preliminary ruling on whether framing of
thumbnail images which are protected against framing by
TPMs constitutes an act of communication to the public
within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC
(InfoSoc Directive).
Analysis
In his Opinion (EU:C:2020:696), Advocate General (AG)
Szpunar distinguished between ‘clickable links’ and
‘automatic links’. While the former require an additional
intervention by the user to view the framed content and
therefore do not constitute an act of communication, dis-
regarding whether such links circumvent TPMs, the latter
do constitute an act of communication to the public.
The CJEU did not follow the AG.
The Court commenced its analysis of the question by
restating its case law on the right to communication to the
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public under Article 3(1) InfoSoc Directive. It stressed that
the notion of ‘communication to the public’ must be
understood in a broad sense in accordance with the objec-
tive of the InfoSoc Directive to provide rightholders with a
high level of protection. The judgment also refers to Article
3(3) of that directive, which provides that an authorization
of a communication to the public of a particular work does
not exhaust that exclusive right.
An act of communication to the public requires the con-
sideration of ‘several complementary criteria’ as part of an
‘individual assessment’. Of all these criteria, the Court
referred to three in particular: first, a communication to
the public requires an intervention of the user, in full
knowledge of the consequences, which gives access to a
protected work; secondly, the communication must be
directed to a public, which is an indeterminate number of
people; thirdly, the communication must be made by tech-
nological means different from those used for the earlier
communication or, alternatively, to a new public.
Based on these criteria, the Court came to the conclusion
that the technique of framing does not constitute an act of
communication to the public if it does not circumvent
TPMs. Framing does not use different technological
means to the original posting of a work on a website (the
Court referred to the technological means simply as ‘the
Internet’). Nor is such a communication made to a new
public, as an author who authorizes the making available
of a work on the Internet without imposing TPMs that
prevent framing and similar linking techniques has author-
ized the communication to the public to all users of the
Internet. If, however, a user circumvents TPMs to frame a
work posted on another website, that intervention is indis-
pensable for users of the website on which the work is
framed to access the work. Accordingly, a licence to publish
a work under the conditions that TPMs are installed to
prevent framing constitutes a limited authorization to a
specifically defined ‘public’.
In this context, the Court referred to Svensson (C-466/
12, EU:C:2014:76) and BestWater (C-348/13, EU:C:2014:
2315). The CJEU highlighted the importance of authoriza-
tion in these rulings. The authorization sets the scope of
the initial communication of a work to a specifically deter-
mined public and also enables the rightholder to withdraw
the work from the public to which it had been originally
communicated. However, the scope of the authorization
must be defined with effective technological means in order
to ensure legal certainty. The limitation imposed by such
means effectively limits the public to users who can law-
fully access the relevant work on a given website
(Renckhoff, C-161/17, EU:C:2018:634, para 35), ie without
circumventing the TPMs within the meaning of Article 6
InfoSoc Directive.
Permitting a user to circumvent TPMs in order to inte-
grate a work published on another website by means of
framing would, according to the CJEU, introduce a rule of
exhaustion for the right of communication to the public,
which is expressly precluded by Article 3(3) InfoSoc
Directive. To come to its conclusion, the CJEU referred to
the importance of hyperlinking in general and the essential
role of links for the operation of the Internet. Although the
Internet enables the exercise of the right to freedom of
expression, including the right to impart information,
under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
the interests of rightholders to claim an appropriate reward
for their creation for each use of their protected subject
matter (Renckhoff, para 34) justifies a restriction of the
right of users under Article 11.
Practical significance
The ruling answers one of the most burning questions in
EU copyright law, which had remained open after the deci-
sions in Svensson, BestWater and Renckhoff. Linking to
works posted on another website, whether by ordinary
hyperlink or by framing, does not require prior authoriza-
tion as long as the content has been made available with
the consent of the relevant rightholder. Furthermore, fram-
ing can be restricted by TPMs, in which case circumvention
of such measures would not only constitute a violation of
Article 6 InfoSoc Directive but also a new act of communi-
cation to the public. In sum, the CJEU seems to follow a
technologically neutral approach regarding linking, and
the distinguishing criterion is ‘consent’, which determines
the scope and legality of an act of communication to the
public. To objectively determine ‘consent’, the CJEU estab-
lished a legal presumption. The posting of a work or other
protected subject matter on a website constitutes consent
in relation to the making available, by way of hyperlinks
and framing, to all users of the Internet. If the framing of
works is prevented by effective TPMs, the consent must be
construed that the authorization to make a given work
available on the Internet is restricted to the users of that
particular website.
TPMs can therefore be used by rightholders to deter-
mine the reach, ie the ‘public’, of a particular communica-
tion. By confirming that framing in circumvention of
TPMs constitutes an act of communication to a new
public, the CJEU has given rightholders an important tool
to segment virtual exploitation spheres. It remains to be
seen, whether TPM-disabled framing will now become the
norm. It will be especially interesting to see how potential
preventive framing-blockers will interact with copyright
exceptions, which Article 6(4) InfoSoc Directive already
anticipates.
AG Szpunar’s solution, which would have required
authorization for automated in-line links but would have
permitted clickable links without authorization, based on
an ‘intervention to access’ logic, might have been better
suited to create a fair balance. The Court’s analogy to
exhaustion also seems misplaced. The physical distribution
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of copies of works is an absolute act, and for various rea-
sons does not permit the rightholder to control the further
circulation of the physical object. Acts of communication
to the public can be, however, technologically controlled
and a segmentation of the digital market enables a right-
holder to explore different modes of exploitation. The
‘linking’ of TPMs with the practical operation of the doc-
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n The lawsuit of the decade—Google LLC v.
Oracle America, Inc.: a victory for
interoperability and the future of
innovation
Supreme Court of the United States, Google LLC v. Oracle
America, Inc., Case No. 18–956, 5 April 2021
In its 6-2 ruling, the US Supreme Court ruled that
Google’s use of Oracle’s programming code in creating
the Android operating system was covered by the fair use
doctrine, thus sparing Google from what could have
been a nine billion-dollar damages award.
Legal context and facts
On 5 April 2021, the US Supreme Court decided a case
between Alphabet’s Inc’s Google and Oracle Corp, in which
Google had been accused of copying 11 500 lines of
Oracle’s Java programming language in the Android operat-
ing system. By upholding the jury finding that Google’s
copying was a legitimate fair use, the Supreme Court sent a
clear pro-innovation, pro-consumer message to the software
industry and practically put an end to a legal battle between
two technology giants that lasted over a decade.
Since the case has worked its way up and down the legal
system, it is worthwhile to recall the main phases of this
significant litigation:
1. In the initial trial proceedings which began in 2010,
Oracle complained that Google’s use of the Sun Java
API violated both patent and copyright laws. The
jury rejected Oracle’s patent claims and found a
limited copyright infringement. However, the jury
ended up equally split as to whether these uses of
Java API by Google could be shielded by the fair use
doctrine. The judge decided that, even though
Google had copied the declaring code, the copied
material constituted ‘a system or method of opera-
tion’ and was not copyrightable;
2. On appeal, the Federal Circuit court reversed the
trial court finding. The Federal court held that both
declaring code and its organizational structure
could be copyrightable and returned the case to the
trial court to determine the existence of fair use;
3. In the subsequent District Court proceedings, the
jury found that Google had ‘shown by a preponder-
ance of evidence’ that its use of the declaring code
and organizational structure in creating Android
operating system constituted fair use;
4. Again, Oracle appealed to the Federal Circuit which
took a narrower approach and held that Google’s
copying of Java API was not fair use;
5. Then, Google appealed to the Supreme Court which
agreed to consider the following questions: (i)
whether copyright protection extends to a software
interface and (ii) whether Google’s use of a software
interface in the context of creating a new computer
program would constitute fair use.
Analysis
The majority opinion was written by Justice Breyer, the oldest
sitting judge on the Supreme Court—who is acknowledged
for making highly complicated technical matters easily com-
prehensible to lawyers. He began his opinion by highlighting
some of the core objectives of copyright, such as balancing
the interests of the creator with the broader interests of the
society and the constitutional objective to promote the prog-
ress of science and useful arts.
With regard to the first question under review, the
Supreme Court did not dive deep into the question of
copyrightability of Java’s API and simply assumed, ‘purely
for the argument’s sake’, that the entire Sun Java’s API can
be copyrightable. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas
stressed the importance of recognizing declaring code as
copyrightable matter and its exploration of the notion of
modus operandi and distinction between declaring and
implementing code.
Concerning the second question, the Supreme Court
held that Google’s copying of the Sun Java API was fair use
as a matter of law. The Court noted that the fair use doc-
trine is flexible; the fact that it has its roots in court juris-
prudence as an ‘equitable rule of reason’ and also is
consecrated in Section 107 of the US Copyright Act sym-
bolizes a cooperative effort between the legislature and the
courts. Furthermore, the Court reiterated some of the well-
known maxims that the four factors of fair use are not
exhaustive, that the application of those factors requires
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